REGULATION BY RISKS – BEYOND LESSIG’S CODES-BASED THEORY

Authors

  • Mzukisi Niven Njotini

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17159/obiter.v36i2.11619

Keywords:

technologies, sharing information, information society, ICT regulators, architecture

Abstract

Recent technologies (ICTs) are both necessary and detrimental to society, that is, the information society. They are important because they facilitate and ease the burden of sharing information. However, ICTs are harmful in that they generate risks or challenges to the aforementioned society. Computer cracking, distributed denial of service attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks are some of the risks associated with ICTs. The said challenges encumber ICT regulators with questions, for example whether ICTs are possible to regulate or not, and how to structure those regulations. These questions necessitate, it is argued, a scrutiny of the traditional constraints –
namely, the law, social norms and the market and nature − of regulation. Thus, they compel an ICT-regulatory framework which commences from the architecture or nature of the technology to be regulated is essential. However, the structure should
move beyond what is referred to as the “codes”.

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Published

01-08-2015

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

REGULATION BY RISKS – BEYOND LESSIG’S CODES-BASED THEORY. (2015). Obiter, 36(2). https://doi.org/10.17159/obiter.v36i2.11619